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Abstract 
The executive ranking pay gap within the company is a continuous debated topic. Prior 
research has developed two different theories---tournament and teamwork. Tournament 
theory advanced by economists Edward Lazear and Sherwin Rosen describes wage 
differences driven by the desire to have incentives to work hard in order to promote 
within the company towards the top position. Teamwork theory however suggests that 
the large gap between higher-level executives and their lower-level executives can reduce 
motivation and create conflicts within the organization. In this paper, we use the 
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) to measure the distribution of the top five 
executives’ compensation and abnormal return to measure firm performance. We find no 
evidence supporting tournament theory over teamwork theory. A portfolio of firms with 
high concentration of executive pay outperforms that of firms with low concentration 
pay. However, these results do not stand at the firm level, once we control for other firm 
characteristics. 
 
Keywords:  Compensation dispersion, HHI, Firm performance, abnormal return, 
Tournament theory 
  iv 
Acknowledgements 
We would like to express sincerely gratitude to our instructor, Dr. Amir Rubin, who gave 
us comprehensive help on the whole process of our final project. His thought-provoking 
ideas and guides on technical methodologies helped us to efficiently explore the 
knowledge in depth. Without his enlightening instruction, impressive kindness and 
patience, we could not have completed the thesis. His keen and vigorous academic 
observation enlightens us not only in this paper but also in our future studies. 
Also, sincere thanks to our second reader, Dr. Alex Vedrashko, for giving us kind support 
and valuable comments.  
Last, sincere thanks to our beloved parents who support our study for many years with 
selfless love.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  v 
Table of Contents 
Approval ................................................................................................................... ii 
Abstract ................................................................................................................... iii 
Acknowledgements .................................................................................................. iv 
Table of Contents ..................................................................................................... iv 
1. Introduction ..........................................................................................................1 
2. Review of literature ............................................................................................2 
2.1 Tournament theory ..........................................................................................3 
2.2 Teamwork theory .............................................................................................3 
3. Sample  and methodology ..................................................................................4 
3.1 Sample Source .................................................................................................4 
3.2 Methodology and hypotheses ..........................................................................5 
4. Descriptive statistics ...........................................................................................7 
4.1 HHI ..................................................................................................................7 
4.2 Abnormal return ..............................................................................................8 
5. Regression .........................................................................................................10 
6. Alternative method ...........................................................................................12 
7. Limitation and conclusion ...............................................................................13 
7.1 Limitation ......................................................................................................13 
7.2 Conclusion .....................................................................................................13 
Reference List .........................................................................................................14 
 
  1 
1. Introduction 
The compensation dispersion of top executives has attracted the focus of compensation 
experts (e.g. Crystal, 1984), managers (e.g. Loomis, 1982), organizational theorists (e.g 
Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1988), and economists (e.g. Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Nalebuff 
and Stiglitz, 1983). Some paper have already examined the role played by the executive 
compensation dispersion. In our paper, we focus on the relationship between dispersion 
of pay among the top management team and firm performance. Recent developments in 
economic theory have developed two obviously contradictory explanations of the 
distribution of pay among top executives: tournament theory and teamwork theory. 
According to tournament theory, a large gap between executive compensation should 
exists. When higher-level executives are paid more than lower-level executive is, it offers 
incentives for executives to work hard in order to promote within the company towards 
the top position.  
According to teamwork theory, the large gap between higher-level executives and their 
lower-level executives can potentially reduce their motivation and create conflicts within 
the organization. Lazear and Rosen (1981) noted, "On the day that a given individual is 
promoted from vice-president to president, his salary may triple. It is difficult to argue 
that his skills have tripled in that one-day period.” When the lower position managers 
who are paid less than their own marginal product see their co-executives are paid much 
more, they envy one another. They suggested that when the pay is more or less equal, it 
promotes collaboration, which can strengthen firm performance.  
As for firm performance, we quantify it as abnormal return (A term used to describe the 
returns generated by a given security or portfolio over a period of time that is different 
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from the expected rate of return. The expected rate of return is the estimated return based 
on an asset-pricing model, using a long run historical average or multiple valuation). We 
find that there is a positive but not significant correlation between abnormal return and 
HHI, indicating that firm performance, measured by abnormal return, cannot be 
explained by the top executives’ compensation dispersion. 
2. Review of literature 
Henderson and Fredrickson (2001) suggested that tournament theory and teamwork 
theory are complements-portions, and they introduced two important sub patterns about 
these two theory: (1) tournament theory dominated the teamwork theory as predictors of 
the size of executives’ compensation gaps; (2) there should be a balance between these 
two theories in predicting firm performance.  
2.1 Tournament theory 
Lazear and Rosen (1979) argued that they preferred to base the executives’ compensation 
on their position within their firm rather than their absolute level of productivity, and they 
suggested that this compensation scheme is a natural outcome of a competitive social 
economy. Moreover, to observe the executives’ position within the firm may be less 
costly than to measure the level of each executive’s productivity directly. Tournament 
theory have showed its advantages in the following three aspects. First, monitoring costs 
might be lower because executives’ compensation are based on their relative position. 
Second, larger executives’ compensation gap gives them incentives to work hard to get a 
higher position. Third, executives who have been promoted before also have incentives to 
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get a higher position since the compensation gap are larger. 
Meanwhile, Conyon, Peck and Sadler (2001) provided some significant evidence that 
promoted from the position below the CEO to a group CEO job position in their data base 
was associated with more than sixty percent increase in the compensation. They also 
suggested that high gap between executive compensation can be incentives for executives 
to work hard for a higher job position. Moreover, Kale, Reis and Venkateswaran (2009) 
found that the compensation gap between the executives, which they called tournament 
incentives, is positively related to firm performance. The positive relation is more 
significant when the executive is getting closely to his retirement and less significant 
when the executive is new to the firm. Lin, Yeh and Shih (2010) concluded that the 
significant of tournament theory as a predictor of firm performance is specific in different 
industry. For lower research and development firms, tournament theory works better; the 
compensation gaps can strengthen firm performance 
2.2 Teamwork theory 
Henderson and Fredrickson (2001) also stated that large executives’ compensation gaps 
might be ineffective because the following reasons. First, high accountability have 
already promoted strong effort. Second, tournament theory might damage the 
relationships among executives that are already politicized and strained. Just like Martin 
(1981) and Crosby (1984), they have already highlighted the importance of “relative 
deprivation theory”, which they explained that executives might experience deprivation if 
they compare the compensation they received to the compensation received by their 
college and notice that their compensation is less than they should have. Similarly, Staw 
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(1984) suggested that working quality might be affected when executives experience 
deprivation. Moreover, Cowherd and Levine (1992) concluded that paying compensation 
more equally could significantly affect lower-level executives' working productivity 
because this is a controlled input. Executives who have experienced inequity may try to 
change their objective situations, and they are more likely to decrease their inputs than to 
increase their outcomes because it is easier for them to control their inputs. Pay equity in 
compensation can influence the executives’ cohesiveness and then influence the 
cooperation between executives. Inequity would create interpersonal resentment, which 
may damage the relationship between executives and thus reduces their collaboration 
(Deutsch, 1985; Levine, 1991). Thus, teamwork theory suggests that smaller 
compensation gaps will enhance executives’ willingness to cooperation and reduce the 
probability of relative deprivation. 
3. Sample and methodology 
3.1 Sample Source 
The analysis of executive compensation and firm performance utilizes the WRDS 
Compustat (Execucomp). The sample is drawn from firms listed from 1992-2014. In this 
database, we use “ticker” as identification of the firms and “tdc1”(the total compensation, 
including salary, bonuses, the total value of restricted stock granted, the total value of 
stock options granted, long-term incentive payouts and all other total annual 
compensation) to measure compensation.  
We also obtain monthly return data and monthly factor data from CRSP database and 
Fama-French Portfolios and Factors database of WRDS, which is applied to measure the 
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abnormal return of each firm in each period. Meanwhile, we obtain company financial 
statistics such as sales and industry classification from the WRDS Compustat database. 
We combine the total direct compensation, monthly return data and annually financial 
statistics for each company using “ticker” as firm identification. We also filter the data by 
sorting out companies that have incomplete information such as unavailable total 
compensation or monthly return data and companies that have fewer than five top 
executives. At last, we construct our final data sample consisting of 327415 firm-month 
observations, representing 3385 listed firms from 1992-2014. 
3.2 Methodology and hypotheses 
3.2.1 HHI and alpha 
The five highest paid executives are considered as the top management team (top five). 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) according to the following formula measures 
compensation dispersion, 
HHI =  ∑ (
𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ 𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒′𝑠 𝑡𝑑𝑐1
𝑠𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑓𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠′ 𝑡𝑑𝑐1
)
25
1
 
We calculate the yearly HHI for each company. We also calculate the average HHI of all 
the firms in each year to see the trend of the HHI and the average HHI of all the firms in 
all the years in each industry to see the industry indicator. At last, for each year, we 
divide the HHI based on the empirical distribution to five groups (group 5 with the 
highest HHI and group 1 with the lowest). 
As for firm performance, we choose abnormal return as the measurement. To calculate 
abnormal return, we use Fama and French four-factor model as follows, 
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R𝑖  − r𝑓 = α𝑖 + β1 × (R𝑚 − r𝑓) + β2 × SMB + β3 × HML + β4 × UMD +  ε𝑖 
where 𝑅𝑖 is the raw return of the firm, 𝑟𝑓 is the risk-free rate, 𝑅m is the return of the 
market, SMB stands for "Small Minus Big", which is the average return on the three 
small market capitalization portfolios minus the average return on the three big market 
capitalization portfolios, HML stands for "High Minus Low", which is the average return 
on the two value portfolios minus the average return on the two growth portfolios, UMD 
stands for "Up Minus Down", which is the average return on the previous 12-month 
return winners portfolios minus the average return on the previous 12-month loser 
portfolios. By applying monthly data into this model and run a regression for each firm in 
each year, we could get the abnormal return (alpha) of each firm in each year. After 
matching HHI and annually financial statistics for each company, we finally got 24323 
firm-year observations, representing 2488 listed firms from 1992-2014. 
3.2.2 Regression model 
The research on the relation between executive compensation dispersion and firm 
performance that considered a series of firm characteristics is based on the regression 
model shown below, 
α𝑖 = β0 + β1 × HHI𝑖−1 + β2 × SIZE𝑖 + +β3 × ROA𝑖 + β4 × Lev𝑖 +  
Σβ𝑖 × Industry indicators𝑖 + Σβ𝑓 × Firm indicators𝑖 + Σβ𝑡 × Time indicators𝑖 + ε𝑖   
where α𝑖is the abnormal return computed from the Fama and French four-factor Model, 
HHI𝑖−1 is the index measuring top executive compensation dispersion last year, SIZE𝑖is 
the market value of the firms,  ROA𝑖is the return on asset of the firms,  Lev𝑖 is the 
leverage ratio, which is long-term debt on shareholder’s equity,  β𝑖, βf and βt are 
coefficients associated with indicators for industry, firm and years, εi is a zero mean error 
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term which is uncorrelated with the independent variables presented in the regression 
model. In the regression model, we choose HHI of last year because the total 
compensation is distributed at the end of each year. Therefore, we could only get HHI at 
the end of year as well. Moreover, how the total compensation of top five executive team 
dispersed will influence the strategy and the way the company work then certainly 
influence the abnormal return next year.  
4. Descriptive statistics 
4.1 HHI 
We use HHI to describe whether the top five executives’ compensation is diversified or 
concentrated.  
We calculate the average HHI across all firms in each year to see the trend of the HHI. 
The results are shown in the graph below. 
 
Figure 1: The plot shows change in the average Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of the total 
direcr compensation (compustat item tdc1) of the top five executives in a company. 
0.255
0.26
0.265
0.27
0.275
0.28
0.285
Average HHI (tdc1)
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According to Figure 1, the HHI changed a lot in the last 20 years. The latest big drop 
happened in 2008-2009, which may resulted from the financial crisis. In this period, top 
executives were probably hit harder that lower level executives, because it is common for 
top executives to get a higher portion of their income from pay-for-performance 
measures. We also calculated the average HHI of all the firms in all the years in each 
industry to see the general difference of HHI caused by industry indicator. 
 
Figure 2: The plot shows Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of different industries. As we can 
see, construction has the highest HHI whereas public administration has the lowest HHI. 
4.2  Abnormal return 
In this section, we compute the abnormal return (measured by alpha) in different HHI 
group and run the t-test between the adjacent two HHI groups. The results are shown in 
table 1&2. 
 
0.24
0.245
0.25
0.255
0.26
0.265
0.27
0.275
0.28
0.285
0.29
HHI-different industries
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Table 1: This table shows the abnormal return (measured by alpha) of different HHI group. 
 
Table 2: This table shows the results of the t-test between the adjacent two HHI groups. 
 
As we could see in table 2, the means of alpha is significant different between HHI group 
3 and group 4, HHI group 4 and group 5 in 1% level. Thus, we could assume that HHI 
has influence on the abnormal return when HHI is higher than some level. We will 
discover more in the following regression. 
 
 
 
 
 abnormal return 
HHI group 1 0.27 
HHI group 2 0.28 
HHI group 3 0.31 
HHI group 4 0.45 
HHI group 5 0.62 
 P-value 
t-test between HHI group = 1&2 0.6923 
t-test between HHI group = 2&3 0.2064 
t-test between HHI group = 3&4 0.0000 
t-test between HHI group = 4&5 0.0000 
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5. Regression 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Independent 
variables 
 
Y = alpha (abnormal return)  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
HHI 0.192 0.239 0.218 0.323 0.368 0.343 
 (0.41) (0.51) (0.46) (0.66) (0.75) (0.70) 
        
SIZE    -0.000000799 -0.000000388 0.000000860 
    (-0.66) (-0.32) (0.69) 
       
ROA    3.238*** 3.245*** 3.262*** 
    (13.33) (13.36) (13.44) 
       
LEV    -0.00138 -0.00136 -0.00135 
    (-1.59) (-1.57) (-1.55) 
       
Industry 
controlled 
NO  YES NO  NO  YES NO 
          
          
Firm 
controlled 
NO  NO YES  NO  NO YES 
       
       
Year 
controlled 
NO  YES YES  NO  YES YES 
       
          
_cons 0.285* 31.73** 40.81*** 0.136 35.14** 45.69*** 
 (2.16) (2.99) (3.79) (0.99) (3.20) (4.09) 
Adj. 
 R-squared 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0005 
 
0.0016 
 
0.0078 
 
0.0086 
 
0.0097 
N 
(Observations) 
24300 24300 24300 22436 22436 22436 
 
Table 3: The independent variable is the abnormal return, which is calculated from Fama and French four-factor model. 
HHI group is the number from 1 to 5 standing for the group of HHI we divided previously for each firm. SIZE is the 
logarithm of the market value of the firms. ROAi is the return on asset of the firms. Levi is the leverage ratio, which is 
long-term debt on shareholder’s equity. Firm control in column is according to permno. Industry control is according to 
2-digit SIC code. Time control is according to year. Standard errors in parentheses.  
*Estimated coefficient or T-statistic is significantly different from zero at 10% level.  
**Estimated coefficient or T-statistic is significantly different from zero at 5% level.  
***Estimated coefficient or T-statistic is significantly different from zero at 1% level 
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All estimated values of coefficients for independent variables are shown in Table 3. The 
regression model is used to investigate the correlation between top executives’ 
compensation dispersion and firm performance. 
In column (1), the result shows a positive correlation between alpha and HHI but 
unfortunately not at a significant confidence level. Therefore, there is no enough evidence 
to say with higher dispersion, which means top managers earn much more than lower 
managers, the company tends to outperform. 
In column (2) and (3), we also include industry- time fixed effect and firm- time fixed 
effect respectively. The test results demonstrate stronger positive correlation between 
alpha and HHI but again not at a significant confidence level in both models. After 
omitting the effects of industry and time or firm and time, the positive relationship 
between top executives’ compensation dispersion and firm performance become stronger 
but still not significant. 
In column (4), we add SIZE, ROA and LEV as control variables in the regression model 
and the result are still the same; there is an insignificant positive relationship between 
abnormal return and HHI. . ROA has a significant positive impact on abnormal return at 
99% confidence level, which is consistent with better performing firms being associated 
with larger dispersion. The other control variables, LEV and SIZE have negative 
relationship with abnormal return but they are both not significant. 
In column (5) and (6), we include the same industry- time fixed effect and firm- time 
fixed effect respectively, and the results are almost the same as we get in column (4), 
except for even stronger positive relationship between top executives’ compensation 
dispersion and firm performance. 
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6. Alternative method 
An alternative approach, that may be considered better, is to see if investing in high HHI 
company produces a profitable trading strategy. Suppose we decide to invest in all firms 
that have a certain range of HHI (the group of HHI we divided previously for each firm), 
we will have a portfolio that will be updated once a year (December). We can calculate 
the equal weight (value weight) return of this portfolio moving forward compared to 
investing in another HHI group portfolio. In this case we are comparing the return of five 
well-diversified portfolio (each portfolio should yield a zero alpha because all 
idiosyncratic risk is diversified away). Assume we invest one dollar in each portfolio in 
Jan 1st, 1992. The five different portfolio will give us the following amount in Dec 31st, 
2014. 
Portfolio Approach 
HHI group Equal Weighted Return Value Weighted Return 
1 1.249094 1.125281 
2 1.25585 1.13656 
3 1.264989 1.145363 
4 1.28097 1.151401 
5 1.337 1.173235 
Table 4: The HHI group 1 to 5 stand for the group of HHI we divided previously for each firm. 1 
stands for the lowest HHI and 5 stands for the highest. Equal Weighted Return is the return 
calculated by giving the same weight, or importance, to each stock in a portfolio. Value Weighted 
Return is the return of a portfolio whose individual components are weighted according to 
their market capitalization. 
 
 
As shown in table 4, the higher the HHI group, the higher the overall equal weighted 
return and value weighted return of the portfolio. The results confirm the positive 
relationship between top executives’ compensation and HHI.  
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7. Limitation and Conclusion 
7.1 Limitation 
First, all the companies in the sample are U.S. listed companies and the data of them is 
only from 1992-2014. Therefore, as in any other analysis, results are sample specific. 
More important, in the regression model we only add certain control variables, but there 
may be some other potential factors contributing to the abnormal return. Therefore, the 
main limitation is that we do not know whether HHI is the reason for the finding or 
some other unobservable or observable characteristics that we do not use. Thus, omitted 
variable bias is the major concern in the study.  
7.2 Conclusion 
This paper examines the correlation between top five executives’ compensation 
dispersion and firm performance. According to our regression results and the portfolio 
approach, we find a positive correlation between compensation dispersion and firm 
performance. But unfortunately the positive correlation is not in a significant confidence 
level. Therefore, there is no enough evidence supporting of tournament theory over 
teamwork theory or the other way around. 
We also find that ROA has a significantly positive correlation with firm performance. 
This indicates that no matter in what industry or firm, increasing ROA is likely to create 
higher abnormal return. 
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